![]() ![]() Postcolonial Asia was allergic to alliances. Since then, China’s push for hegemony in the region has produced the inevitable backlash, and the Quad has become a major feature of each member’s foreign and security policy. When the Quad had its tenuous beginnings that year, all four members were still loath to antagonize Beijing. China quickly denounced it as heralding an “Asian NATO,” and shortly afterward, the idea of institutionalizing such exercises was put to sleep. ![]() In September 2007, Australia, India, Japan, Singapore, and the United States held a large naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal. In the past, castigation by China was enough to draw a potential minilateral grouping to a halt. In a region where the reluctance to join formal alliances remains entrenched, minilateral coalitions offer a pragmatic mechanism to cope with Chinese power. In light of Beijing’s rapid military buildup and Washington’s difficulties projecting power at such a great distance from its shores, the Biden administration sees minilaterals as a critical instrument to boost Asia’s ability to stand up to bullying by Beijing. Given widespread unease in the region’s capitals to Cold War-style alliances, Asia’s new minilaterals are part of a new effort to transcend the traditional alliance framework. Since preventing Chinese hegemony over Asia is the most important consideration driving these groupings, it is no surprise that many of them are sponsored or supported by Washington. India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States established the I2U2 cooperative format in 2021, and the latest addition is the emerging trilateral partnership among Japan, South Korea, and the United States. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad and made up of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States pact (known as AUKUS) are the most prominent examples. Their national interests, threat perceptions, and desires for alignment remain too diverse for a binding commitment in the model of NATO, the European Union, or other blocs.Īsia’s minilaterals are largely a response to China’s rise and challenge to the regional balance of power. At the same time, the region has little tradition of-or, for now, interest in-formal military alliances beyond a handful of countries’ bilateral pacts with the United States. Geopolitical shifts are fast reshaping the region and pushing it toward a new balance of power. The concept goes back a long way: Think of the 19th-century Concert of Europe or the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement born during World War II.īut it’s Asia and the Indo-Pacific that have become minilateralism’s 21st-century testing ground. Small groups of countries are focusing on specific issues and shared interests-often voluntarily, rarely as a formal bloc-as a pragmatic alternative to cumbersome multilateralism and constricting alliances. As the old multilateral institutions, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization, become increasingly paralyzed and dysfunctional, minilateral organizations have emerged as another format for getting things done. ![]()
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